1	HERBERT LESLIE GREENBERG (SBN 494	72)
2	10732 Farragut Drive Culver City, California 90230	
3	Telephone: (310) 838-8105	CONFORMED
4	Email: LGreenberg@LGEsquire.com	ORIGINAL FILED Superior Count of Delifernia
5	Plaintiff, In Propria Persona	NOV 27 2018
6		Short R. Carter, Essecutive Officer/Clerk of Court By: Wymette Padent, Deputy
7		
9	SUPERIOR COUL	RT OF CALIFORNIA
10	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES — WEST CIVIL	
11	HERBERT LESLIE GREENBERG a/k/a	CASE NO. SC 129 203
12	LES GREENBERG,	7-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1
13	Plaintiff,	PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL BRIEF
14	V.	Assigned for All Purposes Hon. Mitchell L. Beckloff
15	CULVER CITY OBSERVER, INC.,	Dept: WEM
16	STEPHEN LAWRENCE HADLAND, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,	Filed: April 30, 2018
17 18	Defendants.	Final Status Conference: December 7, 2018 Trial Date: December 10, 2018
19	I. STATEMENT OF FACTS	
20	In 2018, on the front-page of the Cu	dver City Observer—a community newspaper—
21	defendants CULVER CITY OBSERVER, IN	IC. (OBSERVER) and STEPHEN LAWRENCE
22	HADLAND (HADLAND)(collectively Defendants) maliciously defamed plaintiff HERBERT	
23	LESLIE GREENBERG a/k/a LES GREENBE	RG (GREENBERG). They knowingly and falsely
24	published that GREENBERG, an attorney, act	ed unethically in violation of the California Rules

Defendants detested GREENBERG due to his legal representation and association with the Ad Hoc Committee for Culver City Residents First (Committee). During a bitter-city-councilelection campaign, the Committee effectively opposed Defendants' preferred candidate by

of Professional Conduct (CRPC). (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit Nos. 1, 6, 7, 8, 10.)

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Observer, a newspaper.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3:

After December 31, 2016, defendant CULVER CITY OBSERVER, INC. was paid by the City of Culver City for publishing services provided by the Culver City Observer, a newspaper.

REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1:

Defendant CULVER CITY OBSERVER, INC.'s corporate status was suspended by the Franchise Tax Board before December 31, 2016.

On its website, the Culver City Observer claims, "The Culver City Observer is published every Thursday and distributed to businesses and homes throughout Culver City. The Culver City Observer was adjudicated by the Superior Court as a newspaper of General Circulation on May 8, 2007, adjudication Case No. BS107696." (Ex. 2.) Each edition of the newspaper states, "Stephen L. Hadland – Publisher." (Exs. 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 18, 20.) Approximately 40,000 persons reside in Culver City, with an additional 24,515 people employed there. (Ex. 5.)

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GREENBERG graduated from Garfield High School in East Los Angeles. Four years later, he graduated from UCLA with a Bachelor of Arts degree in mathematics. After working approximately two years in the aerospace industry, he attended and graduated from UCLA School of Law, while working part-time for United California Bank. He has been an active member of the State Bar since 1971. From 1971 to 1973, GREENBERG was employed by a regional New York Stock Exchange member firm as its Compliance Director—responsible for internal enforcement of trade and regulatory rules, and federal and state laws. Thereafter, he engaged in the practice of law as a sole practitioner dealing with business litigation/arbitration. GREENBERG has never been disciplined by the State Bar. GREENBERG and his spouse have resided in Culver City since 1975.

B. THE FALSE PUBLICATION

In April 2018, on the front-page of the *Culver City Observer* and online, Defendants falsely published, "Mr. Greenberg, Esq. threatened ... that Councilmember Clarke¹ and myself be subject to criminal prosecution" in violation of "[then proposed] Section 3.10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar. 'Attorneys cannot use their position to threaten criminal action simply because of a civil dispute. There are probably other sections relating to attorneys who abuse their position by making unfounded threats." (Exs. 6, 10.) In May 2018, HADLAND published in the *Culver City Observer*, "Hadland report[ed] Greenberg to the State Bar for threatening criminal action against myself and Clarke." (Ex. 7.) Those public statements are not privileged.

Then proposed and now current CRPC, rule 3.10, is substantially identical to former rule 5-100,² which prohibits only the *threat, not the actual presentation* of criminal, administrative or disciplinary charges, even if the purpose was to gain an advantage in the dispute. (CRPC 5-100(A); *See* San Diego County Bar Assn Ethics Opn. 2005-1 (2005) and Los Angeles Bar Assn Form. Opn. 469 (1992).)

¹ James Clarke (CLARKE) is a former Culver City Mayor and City Councilmember.

² Current CRPC, rule 3.10, and former rule 5-100 state, *inter alia*: "A lawyer [member] shall not threaten to present criminal ... charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute."

1 This Court deemed admitted: 2 **REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14:** Plaintiff HERBERT LESLIE GREENBERG never threatened defendant 3 STEVEN LAWRENCE HADLAND with presenting criminal charges. 4 **REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15:** Plaintiff HERBERT LESLIE GREENBERG never threatened JIM 5 CLARKE with presenting criminal charges. 6 **REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20:** 7 In 2018, plaintiff HERBERT LESLIE GREENBERG did not violate Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 5-110. 8 **REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21:** 9 In 2018, plaintiff HERBERT LESLIE GREENBERG did not violate 10 proposed Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.1. 11 **REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10:** As of March 23, 2018,³ no civil dispute existed between defendant 12 STEPHEN LAWRENCE HADLAND and plaintiff HERBERT LESLIE GREENBERG. 13 14 **REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11:** As of March 23, 2018, no civil dispute existed between JIM CLARKE and 15 plaintiff HERBERT LESLIE GREENBERG. 16 II. **DEFAMATION PER SE** 17 A. **CAUSE OF ACTION** 18 A statement is defamatory if, among other things, it "[t]ends directly to injure [the 19 plaintiff] in respect to his office, profession, trade or business, either by imputing to him general 20 disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by 21 imputing something with reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural 22 tendency to lessen its profits." (Civ. Code, § 46, subd. (3).) "Words which fall within the purview 23 of Civil Code section 46 are deemed to constitute slander per se with the effect that the utterance 24 of such words is actionable without proof of special damage." (Albertini v. Schaefer (1979) 97 25

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Cal.App.3d 822, 829.)

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³ On March 21, 2018, on behalf of the Committee, GREENBERG filed a criminal complaint against HADLAND and CLARKE with the Culver City Police Department. (Ex. 17.)

"[F]alse statements ... tending directly to injure a plaintiff in respect to his or her profession by imputing dishonesty or **questionable professional conduct** are defamatory per se. [citations.]" (*Burrill v. Nair* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 383; bold emphasis added.) "Imputing dishonesty or **lack of ethics** to an attorney is [] actionable under Civil Code section 46 because of the probability of damages to professional reputation." (*Albertini v. Schaefer, supra*, at 829-830; *citing Katz v. Rosen* (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 1032; bold emphasis added.) Defamatory statements generally "reflect on the integrity and competence of the plaintiff, the clearest being allegations of **unethical** activity or incompetence. (See 5 Witkin, [Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005)] Torts, § 553, pp. 808-809.)" (*Regalia v. The Nethercutt Collection* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 361, 369; bold emphasis added.) "'It is vital to the integrity of our adversary legal process that attorneys strive to maintain the highest standards of **ethics**, civility, and professionalism in the practice of law.' [citation]." (*In Re S.C.* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 412; bold emphasis added.)

B. <u>AN ALLEGATION OF UNETHICAL CONDUCT IS NOT AN OPINION.</u>

"The statements that Ruiz acted unconscionably and **in violation of his ethical duties** as a lawyer are not mere hyperbole, epithet, or "subjective expressions of disapproval, devoid of any factual content." [citation] This becomes clear when the statements are viewed in context. The statements contend Ruiz **violated a specific code section based upon identified conduct.**" (*Ruiz v. Harbor View Community Assn.* (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1472; bold emphasis added.)

Whether GREENBERG "threaten[ed] criminal action" in violation of a specific rule of "the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar" is a provable event, not an opinion. "Threat" means "A declaration of one's purpose or intention to work injury to the ... rights of another, with a view of restraining such person's freedom of action." (*Black's Law Dictionary* (5th ed. 1979), p. 1327.) Defendants have admitted that GREENBERG did not make any threat.

C. <u>DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS MAY BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO AN</u> <u>INNOCENT INTERPRETATION, BUT ARE STILL DEFAMATORY.</u>

"The code definition of libel is very broad and has been held to include almost any language which, upon its face, has a natural tendency to injure a person's reputation, either generally, or with respect to his occupation." (*Maidman, supra*, at 649.) "A defendant is liable for

what is insinuated, as well as for what is stated explicitly." (Id. at 651.)

"Language may be libelous on its face even though it may be susceptible of an innocent interpretation.... The language used may give rise to conflicting inferences as to the meaning intended, but ... it is reasonable to assume that at least some of the readers will take it in a defamatory sense." (*MacLeod v. Tribune Publ'g Co., Inc.* (1959) 52 Cal.2d 536, 549.)

Here, there is no ambiguity—Defendants have falsely alleged a threat. (Exs. 6, 7, 10, 20.) Defendants' subjective understanding, if any, of what they wrote is irrelevant.

D. DAMAGES ARE CONCLUSIVELY PRESUMED.

"[D]amage to plaintiff's reputation is conclusively presumed and he need not introduce any evidence of actual damages in order to obtain or sustain an award of damages" including, in an appropriate case, punitive damages. (*Contento v. Mitchell* (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 356, 358.) (See, also, *Finney v. Lockhart* (1950) 35 Cal.2d 161, 163; *Clark v. McClurg* (1932) 215 Cal. 279, 284]; *McGarry v. University of San Diego*, (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 112; *Barnes-Hind, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 377, 382 [damage to plaintiff's reputation is conclusively presumed to result from a statement that is libelous per se; the plaintiff need not introduce evidence of actual damages to obtain an award of damages]; *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.* (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 349 [noting "defamation is an oddity of tort law," allowing juries to "award substantial sums as compensation for supposed damage to reputation without any proof that such harm actually occurred"].)

The preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof standard is applicable to Defendants' conduct.

First, there was no public controversy. Whether GREENBERG acted unethically by allegedly threatening HADLAND and CLARKE was not debated publicly nor did it substantially affect anyone other than GREENBERG, HADLAND and CLARKE. "'[I]f the issue was being debated publicly and if it had foreseeable and substantial ramifications for nonparticipants, it was a public controversy." (Copp v. Paxton (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 829, 845.) Defendants' defamatory statements relate solely to GREENBERG's alleged threats, not to any broader issue.

Second, GREENBERG is not a public figure. Only HADLAND's publication publicly revealed GREENBERG's relationship to the Committee. GREENBERG made no related public statement. (Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1132-1133["'those charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure'"].)

E. <u>PUNITIVE DAMAGES—DEFENDANTS' STATEMENTS WERE</u> MALICIOUS.

"'Malice' means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." (CCP § 3294(c)(1).) Actual malice is evident when "the allegedly defamatory statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity." (*Ampex Corporation v. Cargle* (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1578.) Here, HADLAND, individually and as a managing director of OBSERVER and publisher of the *Culver City Observer*, acted with malice. He knew that GREENBERG had not made threats. (Exs. 1, 9.) However, HADLAND repeatedly incited the public to invoke vigilante action against GREENBERG. (Exs. 14, 15, 18, 19.) He repeatedly maligned anyone associated with the flyer, e.g., "vicious and uncalled for personal attacks," "character assassination," "out of the gutter" (Ex. 6); "smear campaign" (Ex. 7); "inflammatory flyer," "strong rebuke," "the culprits, "underhanded attack," "denounce the tactics" (Exs. 14, 15); "smear campaign" (Ex. 20). Specifically:

(1) HADLAND recklessly, falsely accused the Committee's members of acting illegally—violating the Fair Political Practices Act (FPPA) by failing to register with the Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC). (Exs. 14, 15.) Prior to HADLAND's publication, the FPPC advised him, "there's no real way of knowing" whether the Committee was subject to the FPPA. (Ex. 13.) The Committee acted lawfully:

First, the Committee had a constitutional right to distribute anonymous political flyers. In *McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission* 514 U.S. 334 (1995), the United States Supreme Court, in holding that one may anonymously distribute flyers, states, *inter alia*:

1	official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to	
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3	decision to remain anonymous is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering	
4	is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and	
5	of dissent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.	
6	(Emphasis added.)	
7	Second, the Committee was exempt from registration under the FPPA. FPPA states, inter	
8	alia:	
9	§ 82013. "Committee" means any person or combination of persons who	
10	directly or indirectly does any of the following: (a) Receives contributions totaling two thousand dollars (\$2,000) or more in a calendar year; (b) Makes independent	
11	expenditures totaling one thousand dollars (\$1,000) or more in a calendar year § 82015 (c) "Contribution" does not include any of the following:	
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13	The Committee did not meet the financial thresholds requiring it to register with the	
14	FPPC. Further, HADLAND was warned of the Committee's FPPC exemption. (Ex. 13.) This	
15	Court deemed admitted:	
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17	Via email on March 13, 2018, Jay Wierenga of the Fair Political Practices Commission advised defendant STEVEN LAWRENCE HADLAND, with respect	
18	to the Ad Hoc Committee of Culver City Residents First, "[I]f this is a one-time thing, perhaps it's the first activity and the total cost of the flyer was less than	
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20	After his publication, the FPPC advised HADLAND, "I don't think this is an accurate	
21	description at all" (Ex. 13.) HADLAND knew GREENBERG represented the Committee	
22	however, HADLAND never inquired of GREENBERG as to the Committee.	
23	(2) HADLAND, as publisher of the Culver City Observer, published various	
24	incendiary comments by others:	
25	(a) CLARKE's letter (i) labeling the flyer "hate speech" ⁴ ; (ii) threatening the	
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⁴ The flyer encourages greater voter turnout in a City Council election and promotes the Committee's political opinion. The statements in the flyer are neither false nor defamatory, and do not relate to any topic necessary to qualify as "hate speech," e.g., race, religion, gender.

Committee's continued distribution of the flyer "will soil your reputation, given that the Observer says it intends to name names," and would cause Culver City to "be known as a City of violence or a City of angry people"; (iii) and stating, "We shall no longer tolerate your [the Committee's] profane, defamatory and personal attacks" (Ex. 18, p. 3.);

- (b) an obviously-deranged-Culver-City resident's letter labeling a Committee member as a "cowardly communist on my doorstep ...hid[ing] his identity," while further stating, "I find these tactics revolting. ... I hope ... that you [HADLAND] are able to identify and expose these disgusting people" (Ex. 18, p. 6.); and,
- (c) the then retiring Mayor's statement, "address[ing] over 400 residents and business people [] at the annual Mayor's luncheon," expressing "anger" about the Committee's activities, labeling them "outright mean and nasty" and calling for everyone "to stand up loud and clear and say enough of this bull shit." (Ex.18, pp. 1, 14.)
- (3) Further, HADLAND publicly incited vigilantes to photograph and identify the Committee's members, so that it could publish their names. (Exs. 18, 19.) Some vigilantes followed and photographed GREENBERG and his spouse. (Ex. 16.) The *Culver City Observer* specifically identified GREENBERG as a distributor of the flyer (Ex. 20), and published GREENBERG's and his spouse's photographs on its front-page and on its Internet edition (Exs. 18, 19.), implying that GREENBERG and his spouse acted illegally as members of the Committee, and, thus, subjecting them to further, potential harassment.
- (4) Additionally, on April 26, 2018, the *Culver City Observer* recklessly, falsely published that the State Bar was investigating GREENBERG's alleged acts (Ex. 20), and that several government agencies were investigating the Committee (Ex. 20.). This Court deemed admitted:

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 17:

As of May 10, 2018, defendant STEVEN LAWRENCE HADLAND knew of no government agency investigating activities of the Ad Hoc Committee for Culver City Residents First.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18:

As of April 30, 2018, defendant STEVEN LAWRENCE HADLAND had no information that the State Bar of California was investigating plaintiff HERBERT LESLIE GREENBERG.

"In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of ... malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant." (CCP § 3294(a).) "With respect to a corporate employer, the ... malice must be on the part of ... [a] managing agent of the corporation." (CCP § 3294(b).)

At all material times, HADLAND was a managing director of OBSERVER. (Request No. 4, *supra.*) Also, HADLAND claims to serve as President of defendant OBSERVER. (Ex. 4.)

One factor that courts have traditionally considered when assessing the proper amount of punitive damages is the amount necessary to have a deterrent effect on the defendant. (*Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange* (1978) 21 Cal.3d 910, 928.) OBSERVER's annual revenue is approximately \$237,785. (Ex. 5.)

III. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Plaintiff GREENBERG seeks \$50,000 in compensatory damages (approximately \$1 per person receiving the defamatory newspaper statements) and at least \$250,000 in punitive damages against Defendants, jointly and severally. Defendants wished to punish GREENBERG due to his representation of the Committee—persons exercising their First Amendment Constitutional rights. Defendants primed the public to be extremely agitated with anyone associated with the Committee's alleged "hate speech," and called for vigilante assistance. Defendants publicly identified GREENBERG and his spouse on the front-page of the *Culver City Observer*, knowing that such exposure "will soil [their] reputation" and would cause Culver City to "be known as a City of violence or a City of angry people." Defendants' unacceptable and morally wrong conduct justifies a large punitive award.

DATED: November 27, 2018

HERBERT LESLIE GREENBERG Plaintiff, In Propria Persona

1	PROOF OF SERVICE	
2 3	STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES:	
4 5	At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 10732 Farragut Drive, Culver City, CA 90230.	
6 7	On November 27, 2018, I mailed from Culver City, California a true and correct copy of the following documents described as PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL BRIEF on the interested parties in this action by enclosing them in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:	
8 9 10 11 12 13	Stephen Lawrence Hadland 4346 Sepulveda Boulevard Culver City, CA 90230-4722 C. Susan Keen Attorney at Law 1515 Seventh Street # 111 Santa Monica, CA 90401	
14 15	and depositing the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service, with the postage full prepaid.	
16 17 18	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on November 27, 2018, at Culver City, California.	
19 20	Paulette D. Greenberg	
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27 28		